We are in dark territory, and no one knows what the outcome will be. - US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, March 23, 2011

Advice to post-modern states: accept that intervention in the pre-modern is going to be a fact of life. Robert Cooper, Director General, Politico-Military Affairs, Council of the European Union, January, 2000.

The Ides of March appears to be the chosen period for launching war in the Middle East. On 20 March, 2003, the U.S. initiated the Second Gulf War against Iraq, a foreign entanglement that persists today. On 19 March, 2011, the U.S. launched, in the company of yet another ad hoc international coalition, armed intervention against the regime of Muammar Qaddafi. Ostensibly designed to protect civilians and blunt a government offensive against the opposition held city of Benghazi by the establishment of a "no fly" zone, the operation lacks a clear strategic objective and may create greater long-term risks than it does near-term rewards.

President Obama sought to internationalize the operation in Libya due to a desire to preserve U.S. credibility, limit political risks to the U.S., and force allies to shoulder burdens. Having achieved this first set of goals, the Obama Administration is now attempting to negotiate its exit from the frontlines of the conflict before public opinion at home and abroad turns against U.S. actions. Transition to NATO or other foreign leadership of the operation cannot come soon enough for many in Washington who are now belatedly waking to the disturbing possibility of yet another open-ended military commitment in the Middle East.

A Short Term Diplomatic Win...

Arguably, the Obama team displayed some of its most adept diplomacy to date in marshalling the international response. President Obama's initial reluctance to act unilaterally and lack of aggressive rhetoric toward Qaddafi became sources of leverage, stoking fears in Paris, London and apparently several Arab capitals that the US would not act. Still smarting from being caught behind the curve on Tunisia and Egypt, and hamstrung by the immediate strategic significance of Bahrain, the Administration was at pains to establish deep political cover for military intervention, and to secure any U.S. action under a legal mandate from the international community. The Arab League statement in support of a no-fly zone, and the resulting UN Security Council resolution authorizing robust intervention, together sidelined critics of potential unilateral US action while also empowering Washington to lead the first phase of the operation against Libyan government forces.

...Dependent upon Managing Fragile Coalition and Domestic Politics

U.S. goals are, in a political sense, defensive. The U.S. now seeks to disengage from frontline operations as soon as possible while at the same time securing broad participation of European and Middle Eastern allies in the campaign. The Administration has encountered difficulties navigating the questions of NATO management, political ownership, and an expanded role by Arab states in the operation. The perceived delay in transitioning leadership to coalition members has also struck a negative chord with a U.S. Congress already angered at the Obama Administration's use of military force without express Congressional consent. Indeed, Obama's efforts on the Libya operation continue an imperial White House style that rejects meaningful consultation with the legislative branch. Congress is expected to hold hearings next week on Libya, demanding of the White House answers, explanations, and not least a clear explication of the precise goals of the Libya intervention.

Deeper Problems in Washington

Outside a small circle of policymakers there is little appreciation in official Washington for the intricacies of Arabian Gulf politics, of relationships between GCC member states, or of the tenuous strategic situation regarding Iran's impact on the region. In general, Members of Congress, their staff and the media tend to simplify the complexities of the region - with dangerous consequences for matters of policy. Looming institutional problems that are certain to beset tentative new democracies in Egypt and Tunisia, for example, will be dismissed until crises demand attention. The situations in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, meanwhile, are likely to be portrayed as popular spontaneous uprisings for democracy rather than instances of provocative foreign influences or historical strife between competing sects. The GCC's intervention in Bahrain has not been understood in Washington from the perspective of Gulf governments concerned about external sources of instability.

Unfortunately, however, this lack of rigor appears to plague the Administration's decision-making process as well. Despite the warnings of the Pentagon and intelligence community, the core White House team appears to have scant appreciation of the 140 tribes in play in Libya, and no solid assessment of the potential for the rebels to govern Libya in the aftermath of civil war. In seeking to achieve short-term stability in Libya and win the approbation of American and Arab publics alike, it is entirely likely that the US-led intervention will have several negative consequences in the Middle East.

Mounting Problems for the Region

These consequences may take many forms. But regional leaders should focus their concerns on the following.

• Regional arms race: The ease with which coalition forces dismantled the second largest air defense system in the region will not escape notice in Tehran. Iran is certain to redouble efforts to improved air defense as well as anti-ship capabilities in order to threaten Western power projection platforms in the Arabian Gulf.

• Iranian pursuit of WMD: Qaddafi gave up nuclear weapons to international acclaim in 2004. Doubtless Iran will conclude the decision directly contributed to Qaddafi's vulnerability to attack today.

• Opening for Al Qaeda in Libya: Many in the current rebel host in eastern Libya fought previously against the United States in Iraq under the banner of Al Qaeda. Should the Libyan state collapse completely, or be split into eastern and western quasi states, Libyan territory threatens to become - akin to Somalia - fertile ground for radical terrorism.

• Ambiguity = Uncertainty: The ambiguity of US policy toward Libya and the apparent lack of an overarching strategic vision for the region presents many more questions than answers for enemies and allies in the Middle East alike. Washington will be hard-pressed to define a forward-looking strategy from this moment in Libya.

Conclusions: Arab States Must Renew Efforts in Washington

These past two months of turmoil in the Middle East have revealed the tenuous relationships of too many Arabian Gulf states in Washington. To date, most US allies in the region have tended to pursue shallow efforts at relationship developments with executive branch policymakers du jour. Not enough work done by the Gulf States to develop "relationships in depth" in Washington. Major and sustained investments in education and relationship building with all strata of the Washington establishment, particularly in Congress and the media, should be made by Gulf leaders to ease this perilous transitional period, to better inform US policy decisions, and to secure stability for the long haul.

This contribution was gratefully received from Eric Shimp - Special Advisor to UAE regarding the UAE-USA FTA Negotiations, and Senior Director, Global Business Strategy, Alston & Bird, LLP.