Kuwait plans to cut expat numbers by 1 million

Kuwait is introducing new plans to reduce the number of expatriates currently residing in the country by over 1 million by 2023. Currently the expat community stands at around 3 million, comprising approximately 1 third of the country's population.

The Minister of Social Affairs and Labor Thekra Al-Rasheedi confirmed the plans in March of this year, adding: "It's part of the ministry's efforts to regulate the labor market, curb the phenomenon of marginal labor and restore the demographic equilibrium of the country".

Cameroon & Egypt are currently negotiating a DTA, discussions continue into June 2013.

Cameroon's pending Air Services Agreement has been approved by Spain's parliament as of 14th March 2013.

Democratic Republic of the Congo & Turkey signed an Air Services Agreement as of 1st of May 2013.

Saudi Arabia govt approved for signing pending DTA with Bosnia & Herzegovina as of 17th June 2013 (initialed 2011).

Saudi Arabia has approved for ratification, their pending DTA with Czech Republic as of 18 Feb 2013.

Saudi Arabia & Ethiopia signed a DTA on 28th Feb 2013.

Saudi Arabia government has approved for signing the pending DTA with Hungary as of the 13th May 2013.

Saudi Arabia and Luxembourg signed a DTA on 7th May 2013.

Saudi Arabiaand Gambia has ratified the pending Air Services Agreement as of 17th April 2013. 

Saudi Arabia has approved pending DTA with Sudan as of 4th March 2013.

Saudi Arabia & US have signed an Air Transport Agreement as of 28th May 2013. 

South Africa & Mauritius have signed a new DTA as of 17th May 2013. 

UK has reported, as of 12th June 2013, DTA negotiations with Malawi, Tanzania, & Senegal.

UAE's pending DTA has been approved by Serbia's Parliament as of 15th March 2013. 

UAE and Benin signed a DTA and IPA as of 11th March 2013.

UAE has approved their pending DTAs with Fiji & Serbia as of 24th March 2013.

UAE has ratified 2 Air Services Agreements this month, Georgia and Panama.

UAE and Hungary signed a DTA on 30th April 2013.

UAE and Japan signed a DTA on 2nd of May 2013.

UAE and Kyrgyzstan are expected to continue DTA negotiations on 12th May 2013.

UAE and Lithuania signed a DTA on 30th June 2013.

UAE approved for ratification on April 14th 2013 the DTA signed with Mexico last November.

UAE has approved for ratification the pending DTA with Palestine as of 24th March 2013.

UAE & Malawi have agreed as of May 2013 to begin DTA negotiations.

UAE & Mozambique signed an Air Transport Agreement on 18th May 2013

UAE and Libya signed a DTA on 1st of April 2013.

UAE's pending DTA with Russia, was ratified by Russia on 9th June 2013.

On 7th June 2013 Russia finalized ratification of the DTA with UAE (signed on 7 December 2011).

UAE's pending DTA has been approved by Kazakhstan's government as of 26th June 2013.

For American citizens living abroad who have either fallen behind with, or who have never filed US tax returns, there are two options to enable non-compliant US taxpayers to bring their affairs back into compliance with US tax law. These are the IRS Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program ("OVDP") and the new Streamlined Filing Compliance Procedure for Non-Resident US taxpayers.

Each option comes with its own inherent points of attraction and risks to the taxpayer and considered analysis of an individual's particular circumstances is critical to making the most appropriate choice. The key difference stems from their underlying objectives.

The objective of the OVDP is essentially to bring taxpayers that have used undisclosed foreign accounts and undisclosed foreign entities to avoid or evade tax into compliance. In contrast, the new Streamlined Filing Compliance Procedure is essentially designed for foreign resident US taxpayers who are deemed a low compliance risk to come into compliance.

Critical to the OVDP is eliminating criminal tax liability exposure associated with past non-compliance and it includes an IRS criminal clearance letter. Additionally, the OVDP offers taxpayers consistency and predictability in determining the amount of tax and penalties, thereby minimizing potential civil liability. While it is possible to accurately assess the "worst case" scenario under the OVDP, it can be a costly option due to the high fixed penalty structure and interest on tax that applies to the most recent 8 years. While foreign residents may be eligible for a reduced offshore penalty, there is no room to negotiate the rate of applicable penalty with the IRS.

Under the Streamlined Filing Compliance Procedure, eligible low compliance risk taxpayers are required to file 3 years of delinquent tax returns and make payment of tax and interest at the time of filing, but no penalties are imposed. Taxpayers who are deemed to present a high compliance risk may be subject to a full examination and the procedure does not, unlike the OVPD, provide immunity from criminal prosecution. However, the fewer tax years and fewer formal steps of the Streamlined Procedure, compared to the OVDP, makes it an increasingly attractive option, especially for those whose status is of an "accidental American."

Zeenat Sacranie

Anyone watching the Syrian conflict unfold should have at least a nagging sense that it has changed into something far different from a typical civil war.  Commentators in the Middle East acknowledge this transformation; the actions of Iran and Hezbollah confirm it; and the Israelis, Jordanians and Russians - among others - warned about it a year ago.  Yet U.S. and European policymakers remain unwilling to speak the truth, turning instead to sterile diplomatic phrases to describe the risks of a "broader regional conflict."  But what's happening in Syria has already reached that point, and then some.  The war in Syria isn't about Syria anymore.  It's about two other things:  an historic Sunni versus Shia conflict, and a proxy war through which the U.S. sees an opportunity to strategically weaken Iran.

Sectarian warfare is a beyond-the-borders reality in Syria.  Shiite Iran has moved beyond training and supplying regime forces to providing Iranian units for combat.  Domestically, Iran's election of a so-called moderate belies the regime's active support to Assad and acquisition of improved technology to accommodate a faster drive toward nuclear weapons.  There will be no policy change in Tehran. Iran is all in.

The Lebanese Shiite terrorist organization Hezbollah has also dispensed with all pretenses. Hassan Nasrallah, the group's leader, has gone well beyond rhetorical promises to defend the Assad regime. Not merely fighting openly on Syrian battlefields, Hezbollah's guerrilla troops spearheaded the Syrian army's effort to retake the city of Qusayr on the Lebanese border, and now fight on multiple fronts. Hezbollah, too, has pushed its chips to the middle of the table.

The Shia powers in the region have thus firmly established their stake with Assad's Alawite minority in Syria.  Tehran views the fight for Syria as a major opportunity to establish regional Shia dominance.  But Iran's adventurism bears the risk of an historic mistake in the making.  The Sunni majority in Syria is certainly not thriving in opposition to Assad, but the conflict is increasingly populated with foreign Sunni fighters, as well as arms, provided by key Sunni Gulf Arab states.

Regardless of the drama unfolding in Egypt, Sunni Arab nations can still drip feed both fighters and supplies to the opposition while waiting for Turkey to become directly involved and the U.S. and European Union to step up shipments of critical arms.  International pressure does not afford Iran a similar luxury; Syria is not a war by proxy for Tehran.  The prospects of Western arms or intervention, amidst calls for a second Geneva peace conference, only serve to increase pressure on Iran and Hezbollah to maximize battlefield leverage in the near term.

The risks to Iran, and by extension to Hezbollah, are manifold.  Tehran is already pinched by years of international sanctions, and faces another wave of restrictions aimed at the country's access to international capital.  How long can Iran support a widening war in Syria, particularly if Iran's involvement catalyzes further conflicts along its western border with an Iraq already experienced renewed sectarian conflict between Shia and Sunni?  Domestically, at what stage could a spiraling war in Syria engender a reawakening of Iranian opposition groups and a second attempt at a "Green Revolution"?  Newly elected President Rouhani appears highly sensitive to Iran's vunerabilities, as he has already tacked to a new diplomatic course aimed at loosening the grip of sanctions on the economy.

Hezbollah, meanwhile, is in the process of risking its legitimacy throughout the Arab world.  The organization has thrown aside its reputation, built largely via longstanding attempts to represent repressed Muslims everywhere, to engage in open battle for Shia dominance in Syria.  As Hezbollah expends troops and resources in Syria, it must also cover its own home front, a fragile Lebanon exposed to the Syrian violence.  How long might Hezbollah maintain an intense tempo of combat operations in Syria before exhausting its resources, its political support within Lebanon, or both?

U.S. policymakers certainly seem to hope Syria will prove to be a quagmire for Iran and its proxies.  Moreover, Washington increasingly appears inclined to abet such a potentially fortuitous outcome.  More by happenstance than design, U.S. policy has produced a situation where Iran and Hezbollah have taken on the lion's share of risk among external players, producing vulnerabilities the U.S. seems keen to exploit.  Interventionists, of both the humanitarian and conservative stripe, continue to clamor for direct U.S. involvement in Syria.  Their gamesmanship, however, isn't likely to cut it. 

In May, President Obama touched on the realism infusing his cautious approach to intervention in a speech on the nation's counter-terrorism policy.  "Unless we discipline our thinking, our definitions, our actions, we may be drawn into more wars we don't need to fight."   Syria has evolved into a battlefield where the president's assessment appears to be the US does not need to fight, and that is vital for determining what happens next.

The Administration remains averse to injecting US ground troops, but has already committed to arming rebel forces, a development which raises the stakes for Iran and Hezbollah.  The Geneva II peace summit proposed by Secretary of State Kerry has predictably led to intensified fighting as each side aims for greater strategic leverage from battlefield gains.  This situation further validates demands for arms made by the opposition.  A prospective peace summit also provides context for the Mr Obama's public request for plans for a no-fly zone; each side is maneuvering for perceived advantage at the negotiating table prior to committing to Geneva.

Another peace summit, however, will matter little to the key parties on the ground.  The fight is too far underway and the stakes are too high.   A ready supply of foreign Sunni fighters and arms, including the potential introduction of heavy weapons from the EU and U.S. may well ensure a prolonged conflict ultimately draining to Iran and potentially critically destabilizing to Hezbollah.  Turkey and Israel face the sternest tests to contain violence along their borders and resist significant intervention, and the sternest test for U.S. diplomacy may well lie in managing the demands and security concerns of Ankara and Tel Aviv as the war deepens.  For Syrians, they are unfortunately living on a battlefield of convenience in two much larger geopolitical struggles.  But the very nature of those conflicts ensures the Syrian nightmare will not end anytime soon.

This contribution was gratefully received from Eric Shimp - Special Advisor to UAE regarding the UAE-USA FTA Negotiations, and Policy Advisor, Alston & Bird, LLP. Washington DC.